It can certainly be argued that the exclusivity of putting in the hands of elected leaders very complex and expensive defense programs, who have no competence, creates ideal conditions that lead to costly and totally avoidable failures. The nuclear-powered missile system “Project Timber Wind” is an example. In fairness, given that the secret service field is supposed to be one of the last bastions of the “gentleman`s war,” one can assume that America has its fair share of silence programs aimed at “lending” research and development to other nations. In fact, the well-known and current fme programs (Foreign Materiel Exploitation) are shining examples. Few people would argue competently against the fact that certain defence programs and operations must be placed in a narrow category. That`s not to say there aren`t real concerns about deeply black programs that very few people know exist. In particular, the exclusivity and compartmentalization of SAPs not only helps to protect national secrets, but also guarantees a tiny number of defence agents, legislators and insiders in the information sector. With such a large power and influence vacuum, self-interest can easily become a national interest, and all of a sudden, SAPs can become safe houses for reckless, wasted, or even illegal activities. For many people, terms such as “black budget” or “black projects” inspire dark images of government figures who, contrary to the principles of a free and open society, work. In fact, with tens of billions allocated each year to secret Pentagon programs and operations, it would be ruthless to the public not to be willing to question what they are paying for, but not to have the privilege of knowing anything about it. Once you are in a special access program, there are still several important roles that help ensure the integrity of each program.
Some of them are as follows: a 2016 Office of Inspector General (OIG) report showed that the DoD could not account for $21 trillion in transactions and adjustments from 1998 to 2015. It is important to note that this movement of funds, averaging $1.2 trillion per year over this 17-year period, “not supported” by accounting documents, does not reflect a real “lack” of money that could have been injected into “black programs” or SAPs. Nor has the OIG proposed that any of these funds may have been lost, stolen or otherwise cremated in ritual victims. As upsetting as a secret budget is that exceeds the total GDP of many countries, it still ignores money spent on secret programs. Of course, the first line of defense to protect the integrity of SAP secrecy starts with those who have access to a program. Whether it`s a person in the military, a federal civilian employee, or a private contractor, there are several requirements that must be met before they can work in an AMP. In 1983, an arbitrary internal review revealed huge inconsistencies within an unrecented and hidden SAP that came out of the DoD`s new special operations division. The program, dubbed “Yellow Fruit,” was set up to provide additional operational security and counterintelligence for missions in Central America. Yellow Fruit was a veritable USAP “deep cover,” with the program`s director, former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Secret Service, Lt.
Col. Dale Duncan, who appeared to have “retired” externally from the military to create a private consulting firm called Business Security International. While leaked defense programs, which fail after a pile of money has been spent, can have a big impact, even if some would say they`re not big enough, secrecy makes it possible to take risks without fear of making headlines. To put it another way, doing things in order, failing in ranking a program can be an incredibly powerful tool for promoting important innovations.. . . .